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I. INTRODUCTION
West Virginia now has two advance directives statutes: the West
Virginia Natural Death Act' [hereinafter Natural Death Act] and the
* Steptoe & Johnson, Clarksburg, W. Va.
1. W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-2 to 13 (Supp. 1991).
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Medical Power of Attorney Act [hereinafter MPAA].2 As indicated
in the accompanying Article by Irene Keeley, the West Virginia Nat-
ural Death Act enables one to give binding advance directives re-
garding medical treatment and the discontinuance of life support
treatment, including food and hydration, in the event of a terminal
illness or a persistent vegetative state.3 The MPAA is much more
comprehensive and allows all non-incapacitated adults to give bind-
ing advance directives4 regarding their medical care, or the with-
drawal of medical care, in all circumstances - not just those in
which the illness is terminal or results in a persistent vegetative state.
As important as these Acts are in clarifying the legal rights of pa-
tients and precluding unneeded litigation, there remains a class of
cases not covered by present statutes. The statutes do not provide
for those who neglect to execute an advance directive or for those
who lack the capacity to do so.5 The latter group contains two rec-
ognizable subgroups: children and those who by reason of illness
or disability lack the capacity to govern their own medical treat-
ment.6
This Article will consider the desirability of legislative action to
remedy the existing legal uncertainty as to the rights of incapacitated
or non-competent patients who have not given, or have never been
able to give, advance directives. Although this group is much smaller
than the classes of persons covered by the MPAA and Natural Death
Act, it is nevertheless a significant group that will always exist. Over
2. W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30A-1 to 20 (1991).
3. Id. § 16-30A-4(d) (1991).
4. The directives are binding to the same extent as a competent adult's. The MPAA, however,
does not make binding a directive that would not be binding for a conscious, competent adult. Thus,
one cannot direct or authorize one's own killing.
5. Persons under the age of 18 cannot execute a medical power of attorney. Id. § 16-30A-
6(a). Persons without capacity also cannot execute a medical power of attorney. "Incapacity," as
defined in the statute, refers to the condition of persons who cannot appreciate the natural conse-
quences of a health care decision or the inability to communicate one's wishes to others. Id. § 16-
30A-3.
6. This article will not explore the question of what constitutes "incapacity" as used in the
MPAA and whether the word embraces a different standard from "incapacity" for other purposes
of the law, such as the power to contract. Because the Legislature did not use a common-law definition,
but gave a very specific statutory definition of incapacity, there is a strong inference that the statutory
standard need not be the same as the common-law standard, and that an individual might lack capacity
for some purposes but nevertheless have it for purposes of the MPAA.
[Vol. 94
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time, one hopes that the number of competent adults who have
executed advance directives will increase dramatically; however, there
will always be those who neglect or do not wish to do so, as well
as those who cannot.
For the groups that are not provided for by our current sta-
tutes, this Article proposes legislative action to establish a process
by which decisions for the non-competent may be made without
requiring resort to the courts. Such a statute would assure health
care providers that they are not at risk of civil and criminal liability.
The Article also considers the appropriate standards by which health
care decisions should be made for the non-competent, with particular
attention given to health care decisions that will end in death. The
major competing values and policy arguments regarding withdrawal
of care are discussed. The concluding sections of the Article propose
some specific standards for inclusion in any legislation.
II. SHOULD THERE BE A SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATION ON TREATMENT
THAT CONSTITUTES THE WITHDRAWAL OF LIFE SUPPORT?
At the outset, a fundamental question is whether to establish
substantive limits as to what treatment can be given to, or withheld
from, the incapacitated or non-competent 7 generally, and from those
suffering from a terminal illness or persistent vegetative state. The
latter two conditions are often thought to require special consid-
eration, particularly with regard to withholding procedures or treat-
ments that, if withdrawn, will result in death.8 Many medical decisions
7. Incapacitated and non-competent are used interchangeably in this article. The Natural Death
Act refers to "incapacity" but most reported cases and commentators refer to "non-competent"
individuals.
8. There is a good deal of dispute as to whether it is proper to characterize death as "resulting"
from the withdrawal of certain procedures, or from the underlying pathology. For example, some
argue that, for patients dependent upon artificial means for nutrition and hydration, any death that
follows the withdrawal of the support results from the underlying pathology, not the withdrawal of
the support. In this view, death results from the inability to eat or drink, not from the withdrawal
of the support. This position is adopted in many cases involving withdrawal of nutrition and hydration.
E.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises, Conn., Inc., 553 A.2d 596, 605 (Conn. 1989) (agreeing with
"majority of jurisdictions" that removal of artificial feeding tube is not a "death producing agent"
and holding that "death will be by natural causes underlying the disease"). Accord Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc.,
497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986). In discussing treatment that "results" in death, the author does
not intend to take sides on the question of the proper characterization in areas of dispute; in this
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may result in death, but those decisions that are known to result
in death for an incapacitated person surely require greater scrutiny.
In general, this Article uses the phrase "withholding life sup-
port" to describe the withholding of any treatment that is necessary
to prevent biological death. There can be substantial debate as to
what the phrase "life support" means; for some, classifying a pro-
cedure as mere life support may signify a pre-determination that it
may be withdrawn. The usage in this Article is not intended to
convey such a decision, as this Article attempts to avoid decision-
making by classification. "Life support" treatment, as used here,
is simply any treatment that is necessary to sustain biological life
in a non-brain-dead individual. Among other things, life support
could include antibiotics, chemotherapy, ventilator support, and nu-
trition and hydration. The inclusion of nutrition and hydration in
the descriptive phrase "life support" is not an effort to sidestep the
question of whether nutrition and hydration must be given, but an
effort to allow the question to be addressed directly. 9
A. Limitations on Treatment Decisions of the Competent
Before considering any substantive limits on medical decisions
for the non-competent, it is appropriate to review the limits placed
on the competent and on surrogates selected by the competent.
In the case of individuals who are "terminally ill" or in a "per-
sistent vegetative state," as those phrases are used in the Natural
9. Of course, some argue that the characterization of a procedure as a "medical" procedure,
rather than a nursing procedure or mere supportive care, is a controlling characterization. Although
not basing its decision on the classification, the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990), expressly held that food and water, even artificially provided, cannot be classified as a
medical treatment. The United States Supreme Court disagreed with that characterization, but nev-
ertheless found that there was no constitutional bar to the standard adopted by Missouri to govern
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. The American Academy of Neurology also appears to
believe that classification is important, and expressly held that the "artificial provision of nutrition
and hydration is a ... medical treatment ... rather than a nursing procedure . . . ." Position of
the American Academy of Neurology On Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Per-
sistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125, 125 (1989). This Article's position is that no
compelling rationale has been given for using the classification of procedures as a basis for determining
whether it is appropriate to withdraw them. Even if that is not so, analytical clarity will be promoted
by directly addressing the question of whether artificially supplied food and water may be withdrawn.
[Vol. 94
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Death Act, the West Virginia Legislature has already announced a
policy to allow competent individuals to reject in advance any and
all treatment, including nutrition and hydration, if they are ter-
minally ill or in a persistent vegetative state.10 The MPAA, in con-
trast, sets no limits on the powers of a surrogate to reject treatment
for the principal, except that life prolonging intervention can be
refused only upon the finding of two physicians that the intervention
"offers no hope of medical benefit.""
Although there are no West Virginia decisions concerning the
rights of the competent to directly refuse treatment, the MPAA im-
plicitly recognizes such a right. The MPAA recognizes the right of
competent adults to designate a surrogate to refuse medical treat-
ment on behalf of the principal.' 2 Manifestly, any right or power
which can be conferred upon a surrogate must be possessed by the
principal, and there is no reason to doubt that a competent adult
in West Virginia has all of the rights that can be conferred upon
a surrogate under the MPAA. Furthermore, the MPAA expressly
states, in its preliminary legislative findings, that there is a "duty
to respect the known wishes of patients' ' ' 3 even in the absence of
a written directive, and that "[clommon law tradition and the med-
ical profession in general have traditionally recognized the right of
a capable adult to accept or reject medical or surgical intervention
affecting one's own medical condition." 1 4 The Legislature listed the
protection of "a patient's right to self determination"' 5 as the pur-
pose of the Article. There is little room for doubt that a West Vir-
ginia court would recognize a general right 6 to accept or reject
medical treatment, even apart from the federal constitutional right
recognized in the highly publicized decision in Cruzan. 7
10. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2 to 13 (Supp. 1991).
11. W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-4(d)(6) (1991). The MPAA also prohibits "mercy killing." Id. §
16-30A-16(a).
12. Id. § 16-30A-4.
13. Id. § 16-30A-2(b)(5).
14. Id. § 16-30A-2(b)(1).
15. Id. § 16-30A-2(a).
16. The generalized right need not be absolute, and there may be circumstances in which it
may be overridden. The only point being made here is that there is same right regardless of its scope
and source (constitution or common law).
17. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852-54 (1990) (holding
19921
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In a number of cases in other jurisdictions, courts have con-
fronted the requests of competent, non-terminally ill patients to re-
move or discontinue life supporting equipment or treatment. In recent
cases, the courts have generally recognized the right of a competent
adult to refuse life sustaining treatment. 8 For example, in McKay
v. Bergstedt'9 a severely handicapped young man sought and received
permission from the court to obtain a disconnection of the ventilator
apparatus on which he depended for survival. The patient was se-
verely handicapped, incapable of any motion, and had spent his
entire life supported and cared for by his loving parents. The pa-
tient's mother had died some years prior to his request for termi-
nation of the ventilator, and the patient's father had become
terminally ill. It was the prospect of his father's death that prompted
the patient's requests for termination.
Refusal of ventilator support is not the only life support com-
petent adults have been allowed to reject. The courts have also grap-
pled with the question of withdrawal of food and water for the
competent. A California Court of Appeals Court has upheld the
right of a competent person to require removal of the tube through
which she was fed.20 In contrast are cases in which the state has
forced individuals to accept food and water, despite their desires to
the contrary. For example, prisoners have been required to accept
food and water, despite their stated wish to refuse both .2 There are,
however, no reported cases outside the area of prisons in which
competent adults have been required to accept unwanted food and
water.
The courts rather universally recognize the general right of a
competent adult to refuse treatment, including food and water. The
only limitation appears to be that competent adults have no "right"
that the liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment did not invalidate Missouri law re-
quiring clear and convincing proof of intent before court could authorize withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration to patient in persistent vegetative state).
18. A summary of the cases involving competent and non-competent patients appears in ALAN
MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE, § 5 (1989) and § 10 (Supp. 1992).
19. 801 P.2d 617, 623 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J., dissenting).
20. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
21. Dept. of Public Welfare v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
[Vol. 94
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss4/4
ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES, PART TWO
to commit suicide. The criticism of decisions such as McKay and
Bouvia is based on the assertion that the acts amounted to suicide. 22
The handicapped plaintiffs needed assistance in removing the ven-
tilator and withdrawing the feeding tube; if the acts were suicidal,
there was no right to receive intervention. Acting on this prificiple,
the California Court of Appeals has recently refused an injunction
sought by Thomas Donaldson, who sought to receive assistance in
obtaining "premortem cryogenic "suspension. " 23 Donaldson, who
suffered from a terminal brain cancer, sought medical assistance in
the freezing of his body, in the hope that future medical advances
would one day allow his body to be thawed, re-animated, and healed.
Donaldson sought a declaratory judgment that medical assistance
would not be deemed criminal and an injunction to prevent an au-
topsy of his body. The court denied relief, holding that there was
no right to suicide or assisted suicide.24
B. Considerations Pertinent to the Non-Competent Who Have
Not Expressed Their Wishes: The Special Cases Of Terminal
Illness And The Persistent Vegetative State
As the preceding section makes clear, there is no basis in general
law relating to treatment of the competent that would justify setting
a substantive limit on the choices open to the non-competent, other
than the prohibition on suicide or the absence of a right to commit
suicide. The next analytic question is whether there is a basis for
applying a different or more restrictive rule to decisionmaking about
the non-competent.
Once one has concluded that competent individuals have the right
to refuse treatment, including food and water, it follows that a des-
ignated representative should generally be allowed to exercise that
right where the patient's wishes on the subject are known. There
are, of course, a number of questions to be considered as to the
specificity of the patient's directions and the degree of certainty by
22. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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which the patient's desires must be shown, but there is little basis
for disputing, in the abstract, whether competent individuals can
exercise that right through a representative. The precise circum-
stances under which the authority can be exercised, and the pro-
cedural safeguards required, are the focus of the MPAA.
A more difficult question arises when the patient has no advance
directive, and no stated wishes on treatment; the family and phy-
sicians of such a patient must determine whether to continue or to
initiate life sustaining treatment in the absence of any knowledge as
to the patient's desires. Although it will not be possible to provide
a legislatively determined outcome for all possible medical situations,
there are recurring circumstances as to which it is appropriate to
consider whether the state should enact substantive limitations. The
two most often-proposed classes in which to limit or enlarge the
powers of a surrogate are 1) patients who are terminally ill, and 2)
patients in a persistent vegetative state. A consideration of those
terms is required before any determination as to standards is made.
1. Definition of "Persistent Vegetative State"
A large portion of the cases litigating life support issues relate
to patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). The diagnosis of
PVS is often colloquially referred to as a diagnosis of "irreversible
coma." No diagnosis of irreversibility can be made with absolute
certainty, but the diagnosis of PVS reflects a medical judgment that
a return to consciousness is beyond medical hope. 25 Patients in a
persistent vegetative state are not brain dead; they experience sleep
and wake cycles, and may open their eyes. They are not, however,
responsive to their environment and show no cognitive abilities. Per-
sons properly diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state have
25. Under the Natural Death Act, PVS is defined as a "permanent and irreversible state in
which the person has intact brain stem function but no higher cortical function and has neither self-
awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner." W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(8) (Supp.
1991). Although the statute refers to "irreversibility," absolute medical certainty on this point is not
possible, as illustrated by the Carrie Coons case, infra note 45. The statute requires a diagnosis of
irreversibility, but does not require absolute certainty in the diagnosis.
[Vol. 94
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no cognition and do not experience either pain or pleasure. 26
A diagnosis of PVS does not necessarily indicate terminal illness;
patients so diagnosed often have an indefinite life expectancy, al-
though their life expectancies are probably shortened by their nec-
essary institutionalization and attendant medical procedures. Patients
in a persistent vegetative state cannot ingest food or water. They
are therefore universally dependent on artificial nutrition and hy-
dration. They are not, however, necessarily dependent on a me-
chanical ventilator or artificial respiration.
2. Definition of "Terminally II"
It might appear that there is little need to consider the meaning
of "terminally ill," but some definitional problems exist. In common
usage, a terminal illness is one that will result in death in a relatively
short time, regardless of any medical treatment that may be given.
The Natural Death Act tracks ordinary usage and defines "terminal
condition" as "an incurable condition ... which ... would result
in death within a relatively short time." 27 The statute does not re-
quire that death be inevitable regardless of whether treatment is
given, although that is the probable intent of requiring that a con-
dition be "incurable." Conceivably, one could have an incurable
condition in which proper treatment would postpone death for a
long period.
This point can have significance, because certain states define
terminal illnesses to include illnesses which will result in death only
if no treatment is given. Montana appears to use that definition:
the Montana Rights of the Terminally Ill Act defines a terminal
condition as one that will result in death absent the administration
of treatment.28 Patients in a persistent vegetative state are, by this
26. The description of PVS in this and the subsequent paragraph is taken from the American
Academy of Neurology's position statement on PVS: Position of the American Academy of Neurology
On Certain Aspects of the Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEU-
ROLOGY 125 (1989). A diagnosis of PVS differs frbm the so-called "locked-in" state, in which a
patient may have awareness of his environment (and may have use of his senses). In a locked-in state,
however, the patient is incapable of expressing or responding to any outside stimulus, although the
patient is aware of them.
27. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(10) (Supp. 1991).
28. MONT. CODE Am. § 50-9-102(14) (1991).
19921
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definition, always terminally ill, since they will die absent medical
provisions for nourishment and water.
In order to promote analytic clarity, this article will use "terminal
illness" to refer to conditions that will produce death in a relatively
short time, regardless of the treatment that is instituted. There is a
clear distinction between PVS patients and patients with incurable
cancers. If this distinction is without any moral or policy difference,
that should be shown by argument, rather than asserted by clas-
sification.
The Legislature should face the question of whether the repre-
sentatives of competent persons, who have not expressed their desires
in regard to their treatment, should be maintained on ordinary food,
water, and basic medical care. Are there circumstances in which life
supporting treatment clearly should or should not be withdrawn,
and if so, are these special rules applicable to those suffering from
a PVS or a terminal illness? The question is not whether society
can or should make a decision for such persons; decisions as to
medical treatment, nutrition, and hydration will be made for the
non-competent. The question is whether that decision-making will
occur haphazardly and by default, or pursuant to a well-planned
legislative scheme.
C. Refusal Of Life Sustaining Procedures For Those Not In A
Persistent Vegetative State Or Terminally Ill
The power to withdraw or refuse basic life sustaining treatment
raises serious questions, and the exercise of this power may perhaps
be improper as to many non-competent patients. There is some ev-
idence of a social consensus, however, that it is permissible for the
special cases noted above. The Natural Death Act, for example,
authorizes withdrawal of life support only for those who are ter-
minally ill or in a persistent vegetative state. The MPAA removes
this limitation for competent persons who select their own surro-
gates, although even for patient-selected representatives, mercy kill-
ing is prohibited, and withdrawal of life support is permitted only
if the continuance would offer "no hope of medical benefit." Should
a more stringent standard apply to surrogates not selected by pa-
tients? Even apart from the basic question of whether it is ever right
[Vol. 94
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to refuse life support, there are sound reasons to limit the withdrawal
of life support to persons who are terminally ill or in a persistent
vegetative state.
Many argue that there is a presumption in favor of life, and
that even a patient-selected representative ought to be limited in the
ability to direct withdrawal of nutrition and hydration. New York's
statute corresponding to the MPAA, for example, reflects this pre-
sumption. The statute prohibits withdrawal of food and water for
patients whose desires on that point cannot be determined.29 Should
the presumption in favor of life, or the duty to treat all persons
equally, preclude withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from the
severely disabled-those suffering profound reductions in their cog-
nitive abilities, but who are not in a PVS? There are those who
argue that persons who are minimally aware of their environment,
but unable to feed themselves or interact "meaningfully", should
not have life support provided to them. Should there be a pre-
sumption that such persons or other disabled persons, as a class,
should have their lives preserved or ended, or should the law allow
for varying and conflicting results?
A statutory presumption in favor of life, and a prohibition against
withdrawal of basic care, should apply to all conscious disabled
patients, that is, those not in a persistent vegetative state. At a min-
imum, any contrary position must confront the fact that allowing
scope for "individual" decisions would inevitably result in com-
petent persons placing a value on the life of the disabled. A wide
variation of capacity lies between full functioning and the persistent
vegetative state. A given degree of ability will be perceived by in-
dividuals differently, and varying values assigned to the worth of
a life under such circumstances. If medical decision-making for the
conscious but severely disabled is not to become an assessment of
the worth of such persons, then a bright line must be drawn on
prohibiting the withdrawal of basic care. Such a line still allows a
surrogate to reject even possibly life saving treatment, upon an ap-
propriate showing, provided that basic care, such as nutrition and
hydration, is not withdrawn.
29. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2982(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
1992]
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III. Tm STANDARD By WHICH DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR
NON-COMPETENT PERSONS LACKING WRITTEN ADVANCE
DIRECTIVES
A. The Standard For Those Whose Wishes Can Be Ascertained
Persons who become non-competent, and have no advance di-
rectives, such as a living will or medical power of attorney, can be
divided into two categories: (1) those who have expressed some de-
sires or directions regarding their future treatment; and (2) those
who have not expressed any desires or intentions with regard to their
treatment in such circumstances. There are significant policy reasons
to treat the two groups differently.
As discussed above, the MPAA reflects a common-law rule that
persons are entitled to control their own treatment. The MPAA and
Natural Death Act were both enacted in order to assist individuals
in directing their own future treatment. In both statutes, the Leg-
islature provided that the failure to create an advance directive would
not create any presumption with regard to the individual's intent
regarding life support, 0 and the MPAA recognizes that an indivi-
dual's expressed intentions regarding future treatment ought to be
given effect, even absent an advance directive. For persons as to
whom there are discoverable expressions of intent, the law ought to
require an examination and investigation into the desires and pre-
ferences of the individual. Where that desire can be ascertained, the
statute should cause it to be carried out. The central policy question
in such cases is what standard of proof ought to be required and
what degree of specificity ought to be known about the patient's
wishes before carrying out the patient's supposed desire to have life
support withdrawn.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan has established that the
federal constitution does not prohibit states from adopting a "clear
and convincing" standard of evidence before allowing a comatose
patient's life support to be withdrawn. At the time of the Cruzan
30. W. VA. CODE § 16-30A-15(c) (1991); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-9(b) (Supp. 1991).
31. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1990).
[Vol. 94
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decision, New York, Missouri, Maine, and Ohio required clear and
convincing proof before allowing the discontinuance of life sup-
port.3 2 Other states have not required clear and convincing evi-
dence.33
The primary basis for requiring clear and convincing evidence
before permitting the discontinuance of life support is the opinion
that life is inherently valuable. The chief criticism of the standard
is that it requires a level of proof hardly ever likely to exist. This
is particularly true if the clear and convincing evidence of intent
must relate to the specific procedure and circumstances at issue. In
its decision in Cruzan,34 the Missouri Supreme Court required proof
of the patient's prior direction and understanding of the specific
treatment proposed, as well as its benefits and burdens.3 5 The court
even went so far as to hold that fully informed consent to future
treatment under hypothetical circumstances is "definitionally im-
possible." ' 36 Because the evidence showed only that Nancy Cruzan
had a generalized objection to life support by machine, the court
held that there was no clear and convincing evidence she would reject
tubal feeding.
A distinctly different reading was given to the requirement of
clear and convincing evidence by the Maine Supreme Court in In
re Gardner37. In Gardner, the patient at issue had visited other in-
dividuals kept alive by mechanical devices and stated to his friends
and family that he would not wish to be kept alive in such circum-
32. The cases cited by the Supreme Court in support of its statement are: In re Estate of
Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (Ill. 1989); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises, Conn., 553 A.2d 596,
604-05 (Conn. 1989); In re Westchester County Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607,
613 (N.Y. 1988); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 952-53 (Me. 1987); In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 443
(N.J. 1987); Leach v. Akron General Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 815 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Summit
County 1980). Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855. New York appears to have abrogated the O'Connor decision
by statute. New York's statutory correlative to the MPAA prohibits withdrawal of food and water
when the patient's desires are not known and cannot reasonably be determined. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2982(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
33. See, e.g., In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987).
34. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
35. Id. at 417.
36. Id.
37. 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987).
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stances. The patient apparently had never expressed any specific wish
regarding feeding tubes, yet the court found that there was clear
and convincing evidence that the patient would wish to have the
feeding tube withdrawn and stated that "[a] different result is not
warranted simply because the life-sustaining procedure at issue in-
volves the artificial provision of nutrition and hydration." 38
As is apparent from Gardner and Cruzan, adopting a standard
of review involves more than the election of one standard formula
or another; an apparently identical standard meant very different
things to the Missouri and Maine supreme courts. In adopting any
standard of review, the Legislature should give careful thought to
the question of the specificity of intent that must be shown. The
mere adoption of a phrase, such as "clear and convincing," invites
confusion and the possibility of a result directly at odds with what
the Legislature intended.
B. Possible Standard For Patients Whose Wishes Are Unknown:
Best Interests And Substituted Consent
There are a number of situations in which the patient's wishes
with regard to life support will not be ascertainable. Persons who
are severely handicapped from birth or early childhood, for example,
will never have an opportunity to express a view on the subject.
The courts have used two different standards in considering
whether to approve or disapprove decisions regarding life support
for such persons. The shorthand phrases for the two standards are
"best interests" and "substituted judgment". Each standard has
some appealing features.
1. The Substituted Judgment Standard
The "substituted judgment" standard requires that the decision
on withdrawal of life support be made in accordance with what the
patient would have decided, were he or she competent. Under the
"substituted judgment" standard, the decision-maker attempts to
stand in the shoes of the patient and decide the matter in the same
38. Id. at 954.
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way the patient would, were he or she somehow made competent
and aware of all the circumstances, including the fact of the patient's
actual state of incompetence. 9 The facial appeal of the "substituted
judgment" standard is that no one would wish to treat a patient in
a way the patient would not wish to be treated. Nevertheless, for
the narrow class of cases being considered here, the never-competent
or the non-competent whose desires are unknown, it appears that
the "substituted judgment" standard is meaningless.
Where the desires of a person cannot be determined, any effort
to act as a non-competent person would act is hopeless. One may
be able to assess what most people would desire, but one can never
know what the individual would have wished. For those who have
never had capacity, it is not even possible to know what "most"
would want. The most recent case applying the substituted judgment
standard confessed that it is a mere "legal fiction." ' 40 In that case,
Guardianship of Jane Doe, the court's rationale for using the "legal
fiction" was unpersuasive.42
In Jane Doe, the court summarized its rationale for adopting
the standard as follows:
39. The most succinct and, perhaps, most quoted statement of the standard appears in Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1949). There the court
said: "the decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by the incompetent
person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency
of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process
of the competent person." Id. at 431.
40. Guardianship of Jane Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992).
41. Id.
42. There has been substantial scholarly criticism of the substituted judgment standard when
applied to the non-competent whose wishes are not known. See, e.g., Allen E. Buchanon, The Limits
of Proxy Decisionmaking for Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386 (1981); Louise Harmon, Failing
Off The Vine: Legal Fictions and The Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990);
Edward D. Robertson, Jr., Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 IssuEs L. MED.
197 (1989); Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 IssuEs L. MED.
131 (1985); Steven M. Richard, Note, Someone Make Up My Mind: The Troubling Right to Die
Issues Presented by Incompetent Patients with No Prior Expression of a Treatment Preference, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 394 (1989). Judge Liacos, author of the Saikewicz decision, has defended the
concept in Paul J. Liacos, Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 IssuEs L. MED.
215 (1989). Judge Liacos's defense does not meet the objections set out in the text. Judge Liacos
argues that using a "best interests" standard is improper because it "ignores" the wishes of the
incompetent and thereby violates them. This defense does not meet the objection that the substituted
judgment standard cannot be used when the patient's wishes are unknown, and that any choice made
for the incompetent may violate their wishes.
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We recognize that in situations in which there is an attempt to use substituted
judgment for a never-competent person, it is a legal fiction. It is the legal mech-
anism by which society (at least in Massachusetts) attempts to vindicate liberty
interests, albeit through a legal fiction. We are also aware that therefore "the
substituted judgment [doctrine] is ... difficult to apply. '43
After conceding that the substituted judgment standard was a fic-
tion, the court, somewhat inconsistently, then argued that "the ef-
fort to bring the substituted judgment into step with the values and
desires of the affected individual must not, and need not, be aban-
doned." 44 The latter argument constitutes an attempt to resurrect
the argument initially abandoned: the claim that it is possible to
know what an individual would want when the individual had never
expressed any opinion on the subject.
Although it is not possible to know what a particular non-com-
petent individual would want, it is possible to attempt to determine
objectively what most competent individuals would want in similar
circumstances. The Jane Doe majority may have been confusing this
possibility with the possibility of knowing the specific desires of a
particular individual. Although such an attempt is problematic for
competent adults, given the wide variety of religious and ethical
views of the populace, 4 it is utterly invalid when applied to the
never-competent. Furthermore, a reliance on what the majority of
people would want contradicts the justification for the substituted
judgment standard, the personal autonomy of the individual. It is
this autonomy that the court sought to protect in attempting to
"vindicate" the liberty interests of Jane Doe.
The Jane Doe court's rationale nevertheless fails to show that
withdrawing life support will "vindicate" the liberty interests of the
patient. When the individual patient's desires are not known, the
43. 583 N.E.2d at 1268 (quoting Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 57 n.16 (Mass. 1981).
44. Id. at 518-19 (quoting Saikewicz 370 N.E.2d at 430-31).
45. Also pertinent are cases such as that of Carrie Coons, a person diagnosed as being in a
persistent vegetative state and whose representative obtained a court order to withdraw life support.
After permission to withdraw life support was granted by a New York court, Carrie Coons unex-
pectedly woke up from the coma. She was questioned about whether she wished to have life support
withdrawn, should she again enter a coma. She stated "that's a very difficult decision to make" but
gave no directions before lapsing into unconsciousness. See Sam H. Verhovek, Right-to-Die Order
Revoked as Patient in Coma Wakes, N.Y. TimEs, April 13, 1989, at B3.
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patient's very incapacity has made it impossible for anyone to vin-
dicate the patient's liberty interests. Arguing that failing to remove
such a patient from life support violates the patient's liberty interests
is analogous to arguing that failure to take such an individual to
church on Sundays violates the patient's right to free exercise of
religion. Undoubtedly, some non-competent patients, were they
competent, would utilize their free exercise rights to go to a church;
some would go to synagogues or other houses of worship, and other
patients to no religious services at all. In failing to take all patients
to the religious service "most" would elect to attend, no "violation"
of the patient's free exercise rights has occurred. The patient is in-
capable of exercising his or her free exercise rights, and the failure
to "comply" with the patient's unknown desires works no depri-
vation of the right.
The Jane Doe "vindication" rationale has the further weakness
that, if it is coherent in any sense, then it can be used equally well
to support the opposite conclusion. The court's theory that a liberty
interest is vindicated by discontinuing life support gives equal sup-
port to the opposite argument: that a liberty interest is vindicated
by continuing life support. Non-competent individuals have the right
to seek and obtain life supporting treatment. Withholding a desired
treatment would be as much a violation of the liberty to seek treat-
ment as continuing to provide it would be a violation of the liberty
to reject it. In other words, if one can speak of violating the right
to choose for those whose choices are unknown, then making any
choice violates those rights. The violation is not cured by making
the same choice for the entire group, nor by randomly making one
choice or the other for each member of the group. Acting on the
basis of substituted consent is, at best, random, when the wishes of
the non-competent are not known. If every choice will violate a
liberty interest, then a choice in favor of life seems eminently war-
ranted.
It is probable that the "substituted judgment" standard is based
on an implicit belief in one or both of the following: 1) a large part
of all non-competent individuals would chose discontinuance of life
support if they were able; or 2) discontinuance of support is the
objectively correct decision, regardless of what the hypothetical
''competent non-competent individual" would select.
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If the Legislature agrees with these assumptions, it should con-
sider stating clearly its belief in that regard, and setting a standard
that reflects those beliefs. Rather than relying on the fiction of sub-
stituted judgment, the Legislature should enact a presumption that
non-competent individuals in a permanent vegetative state should
have life support withdrawn, based on the Legislature's finding that
such individuals would generally choose it. It is probable that any
open assertion of such a presumption would meet considerable re-
sistance. This may be why the courts have chosen to ignore the
question, by acting as if decisions could be made on an "individual"
basis. The decisions cannot be made on an individual basis where
nothing is known about the individual's preferences. 4 There is, how-
ever, no basis in policy for deliberately enacting a standard that is
logically incoherent. The Legislature should not follow the rationale
of courts using the "substituted judgment" standard, even if the
Legislature wants to reach the same results.
C. Application of the Best Interest Standard
In the general law of care for the non-competent, in both fi-
nancial and medical matters, the courts have traditionally sought to
protect the non-competent from mistreatment and to serve their "best
interests." If, as shown above, the substituted judgment standard
is not logically coherent, then there is no reason to depart from the
general standard applicable to the non-competent. In many cases,
the "best interests" and "substituted judgment" standards will re-
sult in similar decisions. In a sense, the "substituted judgment"
standard might always lead to an application of the "best interests"
standard. In attempting to divine what another person might chose
for oneself, in most cases one is entitled to presume that the person
would choose whatever was in his or her best interests.
Two facts have created a problem with that assumption in cases
involving medical treatment. First, one's "best interests" become
46. Decisions are, of course, based on an individual determination that the patient is in a
persistent vegetative state, and has no medical hope of returning from that state. There can, however,
be nothing individual about the analysis of what a patient "would" choose, if one has already de-
termined that one does not know what the individual wants.
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clouded in light of today's modern technological developments. In
one sense it might be assumed that the preservation of life will al-
ways be in one's best interest, but the burdensomeness of medical
treatments and the power to sustain life in the vegetative state throw
that assumption into question. Second, many competent persons will
base their treatment decisions not on their own best interests, but
on the interests of their family members and loved ones. A mother's
decision to forego chemotherapy may often be more motivated by
her concern for the suffering of the family members than for herself.
Similarly, many persons undoubtedly reject future medical treatment
and artificial food and hydration based on their concern for the
loved ones who would suffer from watching them live in an inca-
pacitated condition. Altrusim, not concern for one's best interests,
often governs such decisions.
The "best interests" standard rejects a decision based on the
imputed altruism of the non-competent. To the extent that any spec-
ulation as to the desires of the non-competent makes sense, applying
the "best interests" standard will undoubtedly result in actions at
variance with what some non-competent person "would" want. Nev-
ertheless, acting against an individual's best interest on the basis of
imputed altruism, and thereby considering the interest of others,
opens the door to a host of abuses. It took society a number of
years to move away from Justice Holmes' infamous dictum that
"three generations of imbeciles are enough." 47 Few today would
argue that it is proper to subject the non-competent to forced ster-
ilization or other medical procedures that are not in the interests of
the patient simply to avoid a burden on society or other persons.
Where the decision at issue involved choosing death, not merely
sterilization, for the benefit of others, the imputation of altruism
is especially questionable.
Application of the best interests standards should therefore focus
only on the interests of the patient. Proponents of the standard
should recognize, however, that the standard is by no means as clear
and easy to apply as might first appear. The difficulty is readily
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apparent in attempting to determine whether a decision to withdraw
life support from a patient in a PVS is in the patient's best interests.
It is not possible to avoid the fundamental question of values by
asking whether such treatment will be "medically beneficial" to the
patient and following that recommendation. In most cases, it is nei-
ther possible nor proper to attempt to impose the ultimate decision
on the physicians. Generally, the treatment at issue is ventilator sup-
port or food and hydration, and the medical results of providing
the treatment are usually clear; the patient will be kept alive by the
treatment, but will not improve and will never be cured. Although
in such circumstances many physicians would opine as to whether
or not it would be "medically" beneficial to provide the treatment,
the question is not at all medical. The medical results of the treat-
ment are known and the only open question is a profoundly moral
and ethical one: how to value treatment that will provide such an
existence. In the difficult case of those in a persistent vegetative
state, treatment will always provide a "benefit" in the narrow sense
of continued life. The true locus of dispute is whether life itself is
"beneficial" in such a condition.
Undoubtedly, there are many on both sides of the issue who
believe that the Legislature should preclude an option in one di-
rection or the other, either to require withdrawal of food, water,
and other basic services or to prohibit it. A vigorous public debate
on the propriety of those positions is called for. If the Legislature
determines that it is not possible to enact a general rule for appli-
cation to these recurring but excruciating cases, then it would be
possible to simply repose this choice in the surrogate. Unless the
Legislature wishes the courts to impose their own rule upon review
of the surrogate's choices, the Legislature will have to provide that
the choice of the surrogate in this matter is not subject to reversal
except upon a showing of abuse of discretion or clear error. If the
Legislature decides that there can be no consistent public policy on
these questions, because of the difficulty and intensity of the moral
beliefs on each side, then it is scarcely right to permit a back door
judicial imposition of one set of values over the other.
D. Distinctions Between Initiating And Withdrawing Treatment
There appears to be, in practice, a substantial distinction in the
public mind as to the legal consequences of withdrawing treatment,
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and deciding not to institute treatment. There are numerous cases
discussing the withdrawal of life support, including food and hy-
dration. There is a dearth of cases discussing the legality of deciding
not to initiate life supporting treatment.48 There are only two or
three cases litigating whether to initiate ventilator support or arti-
ficial feeding and hydration for patients in a persistent vegetative
state. In general, the litigated cases concerning the initiation of treat-
ment involve treatment that will not merely provide life support,
but will also provide the possibility of a substantial improvement
in health.49
The relative absence of litigation over whether to institute life
support treatment for persons in a persistent vegetative state can
mean only one of two things: (1) life support treatment is nearly
always initiated for non-competent persons, or (2) health care prov-
iders feel there is much less risk in failing to initiate treatment than
in withdrawing it. Given the prevalence of "do not resuscitate" or-
ders, it is obvious that health care providers do not, in every case,
initiate life sustaining treatment when it is possible to do so.
Upon initial examination, there appears to be no reason to draw
a distinction between the decision to initiate treatment and the de-
cision to withdraw it. Given the same medical facts and same relative
certainty of diagnosis for any given patient, the same values and
risks should apply to a decision to institute treatment as to a decision
to withdraw it. There is, however, one medical distinction that will
generally exist between the decision to withdraw treatment and the
decision not to institute it. Generally, in deciding whether or not to
institute treatment, one has less medical certainty as to the likely
outcome. Therefore, there ought to be some bias in favor of ini-
48. For a rare exception, see In re Riddlemoser, 564 A.2d 812 (Md. 1989), in which the guard-
ians of a non-competent patient sought permission to direct the withholding of cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation in the event of a cardiac arrest. More common are cases involving life saving treatment,
such as blood transfusion cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses. For religious reasons, Jehovah's Wit-
nesses do not accept blood transfusion or blood products in any medical treatment. In a number of
instances, medical professionals have gone to court to obtain permission to give such treatment to
children or other non-competents.
49. Thus, for example, in In re Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Ctr., 342 N.Y.S.2d 356
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973), a hospital sought and received permission to perform an amputation of a
patient's gangrenuous foot. The patient's doctor informed the court that the patient had a good
chance of recovery if the operation was performed.
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tiating treatment, in order to give a patient every chance at recovery
(full or partial).
This goal will be, to some extent, defeated by physicians and
families who know that the decision to institute treatment constitutes
a crossing of the Rubicon. Families and physicians may fear to start
a treatment that cannot be stopped, since the treatment may prove
useless and may subject themselves and the patient to a uselessly
prolonged dying process. The fear of protracted or emotionally pain-
ful legal proceedings will have a similar effect; even if the family
knows the treatment may be stopped by such a legal proceeding,
they may be reluctant to authorize treatment that can be stopped
only by such a process.
There is, therefore, good reason to make the process by which
a decision to end treatment the same process by which treatment is
initiated. That conclusion, however, does not mean that the present
procedures by which such decisions are made are necessarily correct.
The only warranted conclusion is that a unified standard should
govern both the decision to withdraw treatment and the decision
not to initiate it.
E. Proposed Standards For Any Statutory Enactment
It is only a matter of time before West Virginia courts are con-
fronted with questions on the treatment or withdrawal of treatment
for non-competent persons who have no advance directive. Although
there is little doubt that, where the wishes of the non-competent
patient can be ascertained, the West Virginia courts would give effect
to those wishes, the matter should be spelled out by statute, so that
there need be no litigation on that point.
After specifying that the wishes of the patient control, when
ascertainable, the statute must specify how to select a surrogate to
determine those wishes. Health care providers should not themselves
be the persons who determine the wishes of a non-competent patient.
Health care providers can, of course, state what they may have heard
from a patient in competent moments, but they should not be al-
lowed to decide for the patient. Quite apart from the possibility for
improper motives governing in such an arrangement, there is no
[Vol. 94
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss4/4
ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES, PART TWO
justification for imposing that added burden on health care prov-
iders. Ascertaining what a given patient would want is, in most cases,
far more appropriately entrusted to family members or those who
know that patient well.
At present, there are no formal procedures that govern who it
is that gives medical direction to physicians for the non-competent.
By custom, parents do so for their minor children and spouses for
their incapacitated partners. Where the treatment at issue does not
involve the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment or support, there
is probably no need for a statutory ratification. In cases where there
is a deliberate decision to institute "do not resuscitate" orders and
orders refusing or withdrawing nutrition and hydration, it is pref-
erable for the statute to specify an order of priority. Such a rule
would protect both patients and health care providers, and would
provide certainty in cases in which family members are divided.
There should be no requirement that formal "appointment" take
place, but health care providers should be assured that they can rely
on the direction of particular classes of person in instituting decisions
not to provide life support or to withdraw it. The most usual order
of priority for substituted decision makers is: 1) spouse; 2) adult
children; and 3) parents. 0 The author proposes that the Legislature
require unanimous consent within each "class" of representatives.
For example, in the case of a patient with no spouse, but with
competent children, health care professionals should be authorized
to withdraw life support treatment based on agreement among all
the competent children, without looking to the next class.
There are reasonable arguments to be made that a majority within
a given class ought to be able to make such decisions. One argument
is that the unanimity rule allows one obstructive family member to
deliberately frustrate the overwhelming choice of those closest to the
patient. Against this, there can be set the natural tendency of mem-
bers of a group to acquiesce and the importance of and irrevocability
50. This is the order, for example, in West Virginia's statute governing substituted consent for
patients in nursing and personal care homes. W. VA. CODE § 16-5C-5A(B) (1991). It is also the order
set out in the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Health-Care Consent Act. 9 U.L.A. Model Health-
Care Consent Act § 4(a) (1988).
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of the decision at issue. A choice that results in death for another
is the most serious that one can make. Requiring unanimity on such
a question hardly appears excessive, especially given the natural ten-
dency of family members to avoid controversy.
In the event of disagreement among class members, there are
three reasonable possibilities for resolving the treatment dilemma.
The Legislature could provide for: 1) automatic judicial review, 2)
automatic institutional review, or 3) permit the "majority" decision
to be followed after a waiting period sufficient to allow the insti-
tution of legal proceedings. The fourth possibility - prohibiting
withdrawal absent an agreement - should be rejected because it
would allow one recalcitrant person to block implementation of a
patient's desires or patient's best interests. Any standard must, at
a minimum, allow the minority some opportunity to show that the
majority is clearly wrong, or improperly motivated.
Determining which of the three remaining procedures to require
will necessitate an assessment of the need to protect life as against
the disadvantages of judicial or even institutional review proceedings
in such intensely personal and painful moments. Some have sug-
gested that institutionally-based ethics review committees should
constitute a kind of arbiter, whose decision would be given effect
in the event of disputes, absent some legal action by dissenting fam-
ily members within a specified period of time.
In regard to substantive limitations, the Legislature should con-
sider a prohibition on the withdrawal of artificial food and hydration
from patients who are not terminally ill and not reliably diagnosed
to be in a persistent vegetative state. There is a degree of arbitrar-
iness to this limitation, which is motivated by two concerns: the
prevention of any abuse and the preclusion of any inference that
the non-competent have no value and may be abandoned. The pro-
vision of a means to authorize the withdrawal of life-support is based
on the need to affirm the rights and dignity of individuals; that
mechanism must not become instead a signal of indifference to the
incapacitated. There is a fundamental emotional significance to food
and water that simply cannot be ignored, and a social message that
they may be withdrawn for the incapacitated could easily be mis-
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taken for a message that it is appropriate not to care for the in-
capacitated.
As with the Natural Death Act and MPAA, any statute should
mandate the provision of continuing support and palliative care for
all patients. Further, any new act, like those acts, should contain
an express prohibition of assisted suicide or euthanasia. Because this
statute will be concerned with the dividing line between "allowing
to die" and "killing," it would be appropriate to give concrete
guidelines as to what constitutes assisted suicide or euthanasia. That
enormously complex subject is scarcely considered here. Failure to
give consideration to what constitutes euthanasia or assisted suicide
invites future abuse; a practice the Legislature may clearly wish to
prohibit and be authorized simply by affixing an appropriate label.
Further, the public would benefit by a direct discussion of what is
permissible, and would be disserved by an avoidance of these sub-
jects through the subterfuge of a characterization.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Natural Death Act and the MPAA make significant strides
in providing for the autonomy and welfare of citizens. Because both
of those statutory provisions relate to the direction by competent
adults of their own future medical treatment, the statutes enjoy wide
support, notwithstanding the strong differences of opinion as to what
is proper treatment in the increasingly difficult choices medicine now
presents. Disputes over what is substantively correct can be smoothed
over in our democracy by reference to our common belief that adults
should choose for themselves in these matters.
There is no such common ground available as to the area not
yet addressed by the Legislature. For those lacking capacity, one
cannot simply defer to the right of the patient to choose. It may
therefore be impossible to avoid addressing some of the harder ques-
tions. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that life and death
health care decisions are being made for the non-competent, and
will continue to be made. Sooner or later, a dispute will reach the
courts. Ignoring the unfinished work will not cause the problem to
go away and, indeed, is an invitation to inconsistent and contra-
dictory decisions being made regarding the lives and health of in-
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capacitated citizens. Consideration of these topics by the Legislature,
with public participation and public discussion had by groups such
as the Guardianship Task Force, may not lead to a smooth reso-
lution of all disputes. Surely, however, many areas of agreements
can be found and, even where no agreement can be reached, a public
debate on the most fundamental questions about human life would
itself be a significant benefit to the public.
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